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Abstract
Background: Traditionally, health information has been mainly kept in paper-based records. This has deeply changed throughout
approximately the last three decades with the widespread use of multiple health information technologies. The digitization of
health care systems contributes to improving health care delivery. However, it also exposes health records to security and privacy
breaches inherently related to information technology (IT). Thus, health care organizations willing to leverage IT for improved
health care delivery need to put in place IT security and privacy measures consistent with their use of IT resources.
Objective: In this study, 2 main objectives are pursued: (1) to assess the state of the implementation of IT security and privacy
practices in European hospitals and (2) to assess to what extent these hospitals enhance their IT security and privacy practices as
they move from paper-based systems toward fully electronic-based systems.
Methods: Drawing on data from the European Commission electronic health survey, we performed a cluster analysis based on
IT security and privacy practices implemented in 1723 European hospitals. We also developed an IT security index, a compounded
measure of implemented IT security and privacy practices, and compared it with the hospitals’ level in their transition from a
paper-based system toward a fully electronic-based system.
Results: A total of 3 clearly distinct patterns of health IT–related security and privacy practices were unveiled. These patterns,
as well as the IT security index, indicate that most of the sampled hospitals (70.2%) failed to implement basic security and privacy
measures consistent with their digitization level.
Conclusions: Even though, on average, the most electronically advanced hospitals display a higher IT security index than
hospitals where the paper system still dominates, surprisingly, it appears that the enhancement of IT security and privacy practices
as the health information digitization advances in European hospitals is neither systematic nor strong enough regarding the
IT-security requirements. This study will contribute to raising awareness among hospitals’ managers as to the importance of
enhancing their IT security and privacy measures so that they can keep up with the security threats inherently related to the
digitization of health care organizations.
(JMIR Med Inform 2019;7(1):e11211)  doi: 10.2196/11211
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Introduction
Motivation and Objectives
In many countries, health care services delivery is being
reformed—and some say revolutionized [1]—through
information technology (IT). IT potential is being leveraged in
the quest to achieve what has been called the triple aim [2-4],
that is, (1) improving individual care experience, (2) improving
population health, and (3) reducing per capita cost of health
care.
IT developments have led to the digitization of health records,
thus offering new or improved means to efficiently and
effectively collect, process, store, consult, and share health
information. Digitized, health information becomes more
portable and readily shareable within and among different health
care organizations; it becomes readily available to public health
administrators for health surveillance and policy-making
purposes; it becomes, under certain conditions, available for
research; it also becomes more accessible to patients. Thus far,
the significant majority of the literature suggests positive effects
of digitization on the effectiveness of health care outcomes [5].
However, despite all those advantages, the digitization of health
information exposes health records to security breaches
inherently related to IT [6]. Indeed, potential users of health IT
(HIT) express various concerns over IT-related security and
privacy issues [7], and these concerns may negatively affect the
trust of potential HIT users. As a result of this decrease in trust,
patients, as well as health care professionals, may be reluctant
to widely use some HIT functionalities, such as health
information exchange (HIE), telehealth, and mobile health [8],
threatening the necessary “meaningful use” of HIT [9]. The
ultimate result would be ineffective health care delivery [10,11],
as well as ineffective public health monitoring [12] or health
research [13,14].
To alleviate security and privacy concerns, health care
organizations willing to leverage IT for improved health care
delivery need to put in place IT security measures consistent
with their IT development plans. In this study, our objective
was twofold: to assess the state of the implementation of IT
security and privacy practices in European hospitals and to
assess to what extent European hospitals enhance their IT
security practices as they move from paper-based systems
toward fully electronic-based systems.
Background and Significance
Traditionally, health information has been mainly kept in
paper-based records. This has deeply changed throughout
approximately the last three decades, with the widespread use
of multiple HIT, an umbrella term we use here to refer to all IT
systems used for storing, accessing, processing, sharing,
transmitting health information, or for supporting health care
delivery and health care systems management. Thus defined,
HIT encompasses all the 4 functionality-based categories of IT
proposed by Adler-Milstein et al [15]: provider-centric electronic
record, patient-centric electronic record, HIE, and telehealth.
By their mere nature, HIT compiles a wide range of highly
sensitive information. This information includes not only current
data related to patients’ tests, diagnoses, and treatments but also
past medical history [16]. Health care providers need to keep
and manipulate that information securely not only to meet the
patients’ willingness to keep their health information private
but also to live up to the health care organizations’ moral and
legal responsibilities. However, the task of keeping health
records secure is affected by the dynamic nature of the HIT
environment.
In recent years, the landscape of security of health records has
changed following a number of phenomena related to the
digitization. For example, professional and academic literature
has extensively echoed security issues arising from IT trends
such as hosting health records on distant servers operated by
third-party cloud services providers [17,18], the usage of mobile
devices, and the related trends of bring your own device in
health care [19-21], as well as mobile health apps [22,23] and
the IT-enabled HIE [24,25].
Information Technology Security Incidents in Health
Care Settings
A report by Infosec Institute underscored that the remarkable
growth in the adoption of electronic health records (EHRs) in
the last years has not been accompanied by a parallel evolution
in cybersecurity measures, thus rendering the health care
industry ill-equipped and poorly protected with regard to cyber
threats [26]. This bleak assessment seems to be upheld by
numerous reports of IT-related incidents in hospital settings.
According to a 2014 survey by Information Security Media
Group (ISMG), at least one security breach that affects fewer
than 500 individuals has occurred in 75% of surveyed health
care organizations in the United States, and at least one incident
affecting more than 500 individuals has been reported by 21%
of surveyed health care providers [27]. In the 2015 survey by
Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society,
two-thirds (68%) of surveyed health care organizations in the
United States reported having recently experienced a significant
security incident [28]. Reported security incidents came both
from external threats (63.6% of health care organizations) and
insider threats (53.7%) [28].
These statistics of IT-related security breaches in health care
settings are disturbing, and the reality may be even bleaker when
one considers that many security incidents remain undetected
or are not properly assessed [27], as well as the propensity of
organizations to underreport security incidents [29].
Documented incidents show that security breaches in health
care settings can be expensive. For example, Absolute Software
Corporation reported cases of breaches in health care data that
cost hospitals from US $250,000 to US $2.5 million in
settlement payments. Even though these amounts are quite
sizeable, they represent but a fraction of the overall financial
burden of the incidents [30].
Security and privacy concerns, as well as the fear of related
liabilities, may prevent health care providers from leveraging
IT for improving their services. Increasing HIT security and
privacy practices in hospitals is then an important step forward
for effective health care delivery.
JMIR Med Inform 2019 | vol. 7 | iss. 1 | e11211 | p. 2http://medinform.jmir.org/2019/1/e11211/
(page number not for citation purposes)
Uwizeyemungu et alJMIR MEDICAL INFORMATICS
XSL•FO
RenderX
Health Information Technology–Related Security
System
In response to IT-related security and privacy concerns, health
care providers who adopt HIT need to put in place an adequate
security system. This system is “a set of security mechanisms
that are implemented according to a security policy,” which is
“a collection of rules that allow or disallow possible actions,
events, or something related to security” [10].
Generally speaking, an IT security policy aims at ensuring that
an organization’s IT assets (hardware, software, data, and
people) respond constantly to required levels of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability [31,32]. These 3 basic IT security
requirements are generally referred to as the CIA triad
(Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) [33].
The notion of confidentiality is generally defined as “restricting
information to persons belonging to a set of specifically
authorized recipients [34].” Confidentiality requires that only
duly authorized people can get access to data, whether they are
stored, being transmitted, or being treated. This can be achieved
through encryption of data or through controlled access to the
systems. These are technological means, but confidentiality can
also be achieved relying on moral dispositions (eg, professional
silence) [34]. With regard to encryption, the 2014 survey of
ISMG showed that although encryption is commonly applied
for health data transmitted across exposed networks, it is less
applied to data stored in mobile devices and other storage media
[27]. The confidentiality requirement responds to privacy
concerns that are of paramount importance in health care
systems given the sensitivity of information they contain.
With the integrity criterion, it is expected “that information is
protected against unauthorized modification or deletion as well
as irrevocable, accidental, and undesired changes by authorized
users” [33].
As for availability, it requires that a system be accessible and
fully operational whenever an authorized user needs to utilize
it. The availability criterion refers to multiple aspects ranging
from scalability (adaptability to changing performance needs)
to resilience (resistance to software or hardware failures) and
to recoverability of data in case of loss for whatever reason [33].
Methods
Data Source
We used data from the European Commission 2013 electronic
health (eHealth) survey (Joint Research Centre, Institute for
Prospective Technological Studies). The objective of the survey
was “to benchmark the level of eHealth use in acute care
hospitals in all 27 European Union member states, Croatia,
Iceland, and Norway” [35]. The dataset used might seem
outdated but we deem it still relevant. First, the survey we are
referring to is the last one of this magnitude to have been
conducted at the level of the European Union. It is thus the most
recent. Second, it has been demonstrated that secondary data
that are 5 years old or even older can provide meaningful,
empirically grounded, and useful insights in the field of IT
security in the health care sector [36]. Third, over the last 5
years, the HIT security field has not recorded significant changes
that would render our data and our analysis obsolete. The
analysis of recent literature reviews of IT security in health care
settings [37-39] shows that the health care industry still lags
behind in IT security measures implementation. It also shows
that there is no major technical breakthrough in HIT security
and no notable new-brand threats. One can only note a greater
awareness among health care professionals and patients
following multiple breaches of health data made public and the
strengthening of legal requirements. In this regard, the adoption
of the General Data Protection Regulation throughout the
European Union territory has been too recent for its effects on
IT security and privacy practices in the health sector to have
been felt. This regulation came into force in May 2018 [40].
Fourth, other factors specific to the hospital context suggest a
slow pace of changes in such a context. Many small health care
organizations lack financial and human resources for
undertaking substantive (as opposed to symbolic) IT security
programs [41]. For their part, large health care organizations
tend to be complex systems in their structure and management
[42,43], and in such systems, cultural shifts to implement
security and privacy measures may take a lot of time.
Sample
To ensure the representativeness of the sample, the survey team
undertook the following steps [44]. They estimated the universe
of acute care hospitals in the European Union, combining
various sources (previous survey, lists of hospitals from the
World Health Organization, and national ministry of health of
each covered country). The estimation yielded a universe of
8199 acute care hospitals. From this point, the survey team
proceeded to a stratification sampling procedure to ensure
geographical representation (Nordic countries, Southern Europe,
Western Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe). The
stratification process also included other considerations related
to the hospital’s ownership (public, private, and other) and size
(number of beds). To guarantee the representativeness of the
sample at the end of data collection, the survey team proceeded
to nonresponse rate corrections. In total, the survey team
contacted 5424 acute care hospitals, and 1753 hospitals
completed the interview [45]. This corresponds to a rate
response of 32.3%.
Of the 1753 initial observations, only 30 (1.7%) were dropped
because of missing data (“don’t know” response or no answer
at all) on key variables, which led us to a final sample of 1723
European hospitals. Even though the portion of dropped cases
is very low, we performed statistical analyses to assess whether
the dropped observations were significantly different in any
way from the retained observations. Little’s missing completely
at random test (χ25,1723=7.8, P=.17) indicated that ignoring cases
with missing values does not a priori bring about a systematic
bias. However, we went a step further and performed a
nonresponse bias analysis comparing key characteristics of
dropped cases against sampled cases (Table 1). To do so, we
used Fisher exact test of homogeneity instead of chi-square test,
thus taking into account the fact that some cells of the
contingency table would contain low expected frequencies (<5),
especially for the group of dropped cases (n=30). The results
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showed that the dropped cases are not significantly different
from the sampled cases with regard to all of hospital
characteristics.
Table 1 depicts descriptive statistics of our sample. Public
hospitals account for 70.38% (1188/1688) of surveyed hospitals.
Most hospitals in our sample are not university hospitals
(1485/1723; 86.19%). Independent hospitals operating either
on 1 site (710/1723; 41.21%) or on multiple sites (542/1723;
31.46%) make up 72.67% (1252/1723) of the sample. More
than half (857/1568; 54.66%) of surveyed hospitals can be
qualified as small (250 or fewer beds), whereas a small portion
(167/1568; 10.65%) falls in the category of large hospitals (more
than 750 beds). With regard to IT budget, a large majority
(1086/1260; 86.19%) of sampled hospitals allocate 3% or less
of their total budget to their IT function. Hospitals that devote
more than 5% of their total budget to IT represent a negligible
portion of the sample (52/1260; 4.13%). Almost 7 out of 10
hospitals (1159/1665; 69.61%) have in place an in-house,
designed IT security regulation; 6 out of 10 (997/1665; 59.88%)
report relying on a nationally-designed regulation, whereas a
regional regulation is referred to by less than 3 out of 10
hospitals (475/1665; 28.53%).
Table 1. Characteristics of sampled versus nonsampled hospitals.
P valueChi-square (df)% of sampled (n=variable), n (%)% of nonsampled (n=variable), n (%)Variable and characteristics
.910.2 (2)N=1688N=28Status
1188 (70.38)20 (71)Public
335 (19.85)5 (18)Private
165 (9.77)3 (11)Not for Profit
.421.3 (1)N=1723N=30University hospital
238 (13.81)2 (7)Yes
1485 (86.19)28 (93)No
.771.7 (4)N=1723N=30Single/multiple sites
710 (41.21)14 (47)Independent/One site
542 (31.46)9 (30)Independent/Multiple sites
341 (19.79)4 (13)Part of a group of hospitals
78 (4.53)2 (7)Part of a group of care institutions
52 (3.02)1 (3)Other
.057.4 (3)N=1568N=25Size (number of beds)
363 (23.15)11 (44)<101
494 (31.51)8 (32)101 to 250
544 (34.69)6 (24)251 to 750
167 (10.65)0 (0)>750
.621.6 (3)N=1260N=19ITa budget (% of total hospital budget)
486 (38.57)10 (53)<1%
600 (47.62)7 (37)1% to 3%
122 (9.68)2 (11)3.1% to 5%
52 (4.13)0 (0)>5%
N=1665N=23Security regulation
.291.4 (1)997 (59.88)11 (48)National
.162.7 (1)475 (28.53)3 (13)Regional
.181.8 (1)1159 (69.61)13 (57)Hospital
aIT: information technology.
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Table 2. Security and privacy practices measures.
Measure (Yes or no)Variable
Confidentiality: which of the following security measures are taken to protect the patient data stored and transmitted by the hospital’s ITa
system?
Encryption of stored dataStored data
Encryption of transmitted dataTransmitted data
Workstations with access only through health professional cards or codesAccess control
Is data entry in the hospital’s IT system certified with digital signature?Integrity
Is your IT team able to immediately restore critical clinical information system operations if a disaster
causes the complete loss of data at your hospital’s primary data center?
Availability
aIT: information technology.
Measurement
For contextual variables, measures used are depicted in Table
1, column “characteristics.” The level attained by a hospital in
the transition from a paper-based system to a fully
electronic-based system was measured on a 9-point Likert scale
(1=totally paper-based and 9=totally electronic-based, with
point 5 as a hybrid model). For simplicity, this measure has
been transformed into 3 nominal categories: hospitals that chose
positions from 1 to 3 were qualified as having a paper-dominant
system; a hybrid system label was given to hospitals that chose
positions from 4 to 6, and the remaining hospitals (positions
from 7 to 9) were deemed to have an electronic-dominant
system. We present in Table 2 the measures used to capture the
implementation of HIT security and privacy practices used as
our clustering variables. These practices were measured through
a dichotomous scale (eg, coding “1” if a confidentiality-related
practice is implemented and “0” when it is not implemented).
To check for possible variables multicollinearity before
performing our cluster analysis [46], we produced a correlation
matrix of all our variables (clustering variables and contextual
variables; Multimedia Appendix 1). The results show that the
risk of multicollinearity is very low: all the correlations
coefficients are very low, the maximum correlation coefficient
noted being .359 (between encryption of stored data and
encryption of transmitted data). Besides, multicollinearity
diagnostics (Multimedia Appendix 1) show that the tolerance
values vary between .78 and .96, far above the commonly used
cutoff threshold of .1 [47]. The highest variance inflation factor
noted is equal to 1.28, far below the usual cutoff threshold of
10.0 [47]. These values show that multicollinearity is not a
concern in our data.
To assess the state of the implementation of IT security and
privacy practices in European hospitals, we developed an IT
security index for each hospital. We developed the IT security
based on the responses given by hospitals with regard to their
security practices. We considered 5 questions asked (see Table
2). A given hospital had to respond whether or not it has
implemented the security practice related to confidentiality (3
questions), to integrity (1 question), and to availability (1
question). With a “Yes” response, a hospital scored 1 point and
0 otherwise (a “No” answer). The IT security index reflects the
total score obtained by each hospital for the 5 questions.
However, considering that the confidentiality component was
measured through 3 questions, whereas the other 2 components
(integrity and availability) were measured each by 1 question,
we estimated that the score obtained by simply summing up the
results from the 5 questions would be skewed in favor of the
confidentiality component. In the absence of theoretical or
empirical evidence to the effect that any of the 3 components
of the security triad (confidentiality-integrity-availability) would
be more significant when compared with the 2 others, we
hypothesized an equal weight for the 3 components. That is
why the confidentiality component accounts for 1 in the index
even if it is measured through 3 questions: each of the 3
questions related to confidentiality accounted for one-third (1/3)
of the value of confidentiality in the index. As the integrity and
availability components account each for 1, the maximum score
of the IT security index for a given hospital is 3 (for a hospital
that has all the 5 practices implemented: 1/3+1/3+1/3+1+1),
and the minimum is 0 (for a hospital with none of the practices
implemented).
Cluster Analysis
We performed an agglomerative hierarchical clustering
procedure combining Ward’s minimum variance criterion with
the squared Euclidian distance. This procedure allows
distributing the observations into distinct subgroups (clusters)
in the way that maximizes at the same time the intrasubgroup
similarity and the intersubgroups dissimilarity [48]. Each
subgroup comprises hospitals more or less homogenous with
regard to clustering criteria (in this case HIT security practices
implemented), and each subgroup is highly distinct to other
subgroups with regard to the same criteria.
To identify the optimal number of clusters, we first examined
the Euclidian distances across the clusters in the dendrogram
produced with the clustering procedure. We identified 2
apparently equally plausible solutions, a 3-cluster and a 4-cluster
solution. To decide which of these 2 solutions would be better,
we followed Ketchen and Shook’s [49] recommendation: we
ascertained the robustness of both by replicating the clustering
algorithm on subsamples of about 80%, 60%, and 40% of
observations randomly selected using SPSS’s random selection
functionality (SPSS version 24, SPSS Inc). The analysis of the
dendrograms produced with all these subsamples suggested a
slight advantage of the 4-cluster solution over the 3-cluster
solution. However, when we performed a discriminant analysis
test, we found that 2 clusters of the 4-solution clusters were too
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close, whereas all clusters in the 3-cluster solution were
well-separated. Therefore, we chose the 3-cluster solution.
The discriminant analysis also allowed us to test the validity of
the clusters. This test “runs the data back through the
minimum-variance method as a discriminant function to see
how accurately hospitals are classified [50].” The results of this
test indicated a perfect classification accuracy (100%) for
clusters 2 and 3 and a high level of classification accuracy
(92.3%) for cluster 1. Overall, 98.7% of original observations
were correctly classified. Moreover, based on cross-validation
with analysis and holdout subsamples of respectively 60%
(n=992) and 40% (n=731) of the total sample [51], for the
3-cluster solution, both hit ratios (97.7% for the analysis
subsample and 98.1% for the holdout subsample) largely
exceeded the threshold values of both maximum chance criteria
(Cmax) and proportional chance criteria (CPro). Indeed, the 2 hit
ratios should be greater than Max (1.25[CPro; Cmax]), which is
the case as in this study CPro=34% and Cmax=39.3%. Thus, the
null hypothesis that the percentage correctly classified was not
significantly different from what would be classified by chance
alone was rejected.
Results
Implementation Level of Information Technology
Security and Privacy Practices
For the whole sample, the mean IT security index is 1.26 (with
an SD of 0.83), the median being 1.33. In Table 3, we present
the detailed statistics of hospitals by IT security index level.
It can be noted that only a tiny fraction of hospitals (50/1723;
2.90%) display a perfect IT security index (3). The nonnegligible
fraction of hospitals (225/1723; 13.06%) has no IT security and
privacy practices implemented whatsoever (IT security index=0).
From the column “cumulative %,” one can note the total
percentage of hospitals that does not exceed a given level of the
IT security index. For example, at a glance, one will see that
62.17% (1071/1723) of hospitals have achieved an IT security
index of 1.33 or less. In absolute terms, these levels seem very
low. Is it possible that the less electronically advanced hospitals
would deem it unnecessary to implement extended IT security
and privacy practices, thus displaying lower levels of IT security
index? To test this hypothesis, we confronted the IT security
index with the transition level toward a fully electronic-based
system.
Before performing this comparison, it is worthwhile to note that
a majority of sampled hospitals (1056/1723; 61.28%) consider
currently using a hybrid system (transition levels 4, 5, and 6),
as they were more or less halfway toward a fully
electronic-based system. An electronic-dominant system is
found in 26.29% (453/1723) of hospitals, whereas a
paper-dominant system is found in only 12.42% (214/1723) of
them.
In Figure 1, we present the mean scores on our IT security index
(vertical axis) for different groups of hospitals according to their
level in transition toward a fully electronic-based system
(horizontal axis).
Globally speaking, the mean score of IT security index is low
for all 3 groups constituted on the basis of their transition level
to a completely electronic system. It appears that the IT security
index improves as one moves from the group of hospitals with
a paper-dominant system (levels 1, 2, and 3) to the group of
hospitals with electronic-dominant system (levels 7, 8, and 9)
through the group of hospitals in a hybrid position (levels 4, 5,
and 6). However, a further analysis depicts a much more
nuanced picture. For the purposes of this analysis, we produced
a scatter plot (Figure 2) indicating every hospital’s coordinate
(a and b) depicting its position with regard to the transition level
of its system (a) and to its IT security index (b). To facilitate
the reading of the coordinates, we used a “jitter” to make sure
that multiple observations that fall in the same coordinate can
be visualized.
Table 3. Information technology security index level statistics.
Cumulative %n (%)ITa security index level
13.06225 (13.06)0.00
23.86186 (10.80)0.33
29.90104 (6.04)0.67
45.51269 (15.61)1.00
62.17287 (16.66)1.33
78.19276 (16.02)1.67
83.7095 (5.51)2.00
89.56101 (5.86)2.33
97.10130 (7.54)2.67
100.0050 (2.90)3.00
—
b1723 (100.00)Total
aIT: information technology.
bNot applicable.
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Figure 1. Transition level toward electronic-based system versus information technology security index-1.
Figure 2. Transition level toward electronic-based system versus information technology security index-2. IT: information technology.
For facilitating the analysis of the figure, we added a diagonal
line (D). If hospitals were enhancing their IT security and
privacy practices as they moved forward, points representing
hospitals would be scattered around the diagonal line. Instead,
we found that points are scattered almost all over the surface
of the figure.
Hospitals far above (far below) the diagonal line display a
security index that is superior (inferior) to the average level
required by their transition level toward a fully electronic-based
system. For example, any hospital represented by X1 point has
an IT-related security index above the theoretical level required
by its progress toward an electronic-dominant system.
Conversely, a hospital represented by X2 displays a security
index far below the level it should attain, considering how far
it has progressed toward a fully electronic-based system. The
security index of hospital X3 is consistent with its progress in
electronic-based system implementation.
The slope of the ascending curve in the figure (Y) suggests that
there is a trend toward increasing IT security and privacy
measures when hospitals move from a paper-based system to
an electronic-based system. Though this finding is positive, it
appears that the trend is not strong enough. Otherwise, the shape
of the curve would be closer to the diagonal line.
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Information Technology Security Level Versus Context
Variables and Paper/Electronic Transition Level
In the previous section, we tested the relationship between the
level of transition toward fully electronic systems on the one
hand and the level of implementation of IT security on the other.
We intuitively assumed a linear relationship between the 2. In
this section, we take the analysis further, not only by considering
the contextual variables in addition to the paper/electronic
transition level but also by testing the validity of the linear
relationship assumption between the transition level and IT
security level.
In Table 4 we present the results of multivariate regression
analyses testing whether hospitals’ IT security levels can be
predicted by hospitals’ characteristics (contextual variables)
and/or their transition level from paper to electronic system.
The results from both linear models (models 1 and 2) show that
hospitals’ characteristics and their transition level toward fully
electronic-based system significantly contribute to the IT
security level, with total R2 equals, respectively, to 8.6%
(F16,1706=10.05; P=.001) and 12.0% (F1,1705=65.12; P=.001).
With models 3 and 4, we tested alternative nonlinear models
and concluded that they do not bring about any significant
contribution.
Results of Cluster Analysis
The 3 patterns of HIT-related security practices resulting from
our cluster analysis are presented in Table 5. The patterns in
Table 5 are alternatively depicted in Figure 3, which shows
cluster by cluster the implementation levels of each IT security
practice measured in this study.
Before analyzing cluster differences, it is worth noting the grand
mean of HIT security practices in sampled hospitals. As our
security variables are measured through a dichotomous scale
(1 if a practice is implemented and 0 if not implemented), the
grand mean corresponds to the rate of hospitals that have a given
practice implemented. This rate is presented in brackets in the
column “variable” of Table 5. Overall, the most implemented
practice is the one intended to ensure the confidentiality of
electronically-transmitted data (present in 59% of hospitals),
closely followed by the practice aiming at guaranteeing the
availability of health data in case of a disaster (57%). The less
implemented security practice is the access control or the IT
workstations that contain sensitive health information (18%).
This means that many hospitals tend to overlook the insider
threat, which is preoccupying considering that insider threats
represent over 50% of IT security breaches and are potentially
more devastating than external threats [52,53].
Table 4. Regression analyses (dependent variable: information technology security level).
P valueF (df)Delta R2Adjusted R2R2RModel
<.00110.052 (16).086.078.086.2941a
<.00165.116 (1).034.111.120.3462b
.750.104 (1).000.111.120.3463c
.171.911 (1).001.111.121.3484d
aModel 1 predictors: contextual variables (see Table 1).
bModel 2 predictors: contextual variables+ transition level toward electronic system.
cModel 3 predictors: contextual variables+(transition level toward electronic system)2.
dModel 4 predictors: contextual variables+(transition level toward electronic system)3.
Table 5. Health information technology security patterns from cluster analysis. Within rows, different superscripts (*, †, and ‡) indicate significant
(P<.05) pair-wise differences between means on Tamhane’s T2 (post hoc) test.
Analysis of varianceClusterVariable (grand mean)
P valueF test (df)3, n (%)=677 (39.29)2, n (%)=533 (30.93)1, n (%)=513 (29.77)
Confidentiality
<.001106.6 (2)0.18†0.47*0.53*Stored data (0.37)
<.0019614.0 (2)0.00‡1.00*0.93†Transmitted data (0.59)
<.001303.9 (2)0.10†0.00‡0.48*Access control (0.18)
<.001763.7 (2)0.20†0.00‡0.78*Integrity (0.31)
.181.7 (2)0.540.590.58Availability (0.57)
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Figure 3. Implementation levels of information technology security practices in hospitals by cluster.
On the basis of Tamhane’s post hoc test (Table 5), we can
immediately see that the “availability” criterion does not allow
for the discrimination among the 3 clusters: hospitals that have
implemented security measures allowing them to immediately
recover their EHRs after a disaster are found in almost the same
proportions in the 3 clusters (54% to 59%). However, there are
differences among the 3 clusters with regard to confidentiality
and integrity-related practices.
Overall, the strongest implementers of IT security practices are
found in cluster 1, which accounts for 29.77% (513/1723) of
surveyed hospitals. The implementation rate of each of the 4
distinctive HIT-related security practices is higher in this cluster
than the average rate for all hospitals in our sample.
The weakest implementers of IT security practices are grouped
in cluster 3, which comprises 39.29% (677/1723) of the sample.
Implementation rates for all IT security practices are lower in
this cluster than the overall average rates of the sample. Of note
is that none of the 677 hospitals in this group uses encryption
to protect electronically-transmitted health records, and only
10.0% of them enforce an access control to HIT systems.
In the middle position comes cluster 2 (533/1723; 30.93%).
Although hospitals in cluster 2 have implemented IT security
measures related to stored data and transmitted data in higher
proportions, none of them have implemented either access
control measures or integrity-related practices.
Discussion
Health Information Technology Security Index Across
Clusters
The IT security index for all the hospitals in our sample (mean
of 1.26) depicts a low level of the implementation of HIT
security practices, considering HIT users’ concerns over
IT-related security and privacy [7]. The IT security index level
varies across the 3 clusters. It is relatively strong (2.00) for
cluster 1, very low (0.83) for cluster 3, and low (1.08) for cluster
2. The box plot presented in Figure 4 shows the distribution of
observations within each cluster according to the level of the
IT security index. Moreover, 50% of hospitals in the strongest
cluster (1) display an IT security index equal to or greater than
2, whereas for 25% of them, the IT security index is equal to
or above 2.67. Cluster 3 is the only cluster that comprises
hospitals with an IT security index that equals zero (25% of
hospitals in this cluster). Furthermore, 75% of hospitals in
cluster 3 present an IT security index that is equal to or less than
1. The IT security index for hospitals in cluster 2 varies from a
minimum of 0.33 to a maximum of 1.67, with 50% of hospitals
in this cluster displaying an IT security index between 1.33 and
1.67.
The results from the boxplot are meaningful in that they support
our cluster qualification about each cluster’s relative strength
or weakness of HIT security implementation. It is particularly
interesting to note that despite the gradation that establishes a
hierarchy among clusters, allowing a stronger cluster to be
identified compared with others in terms of IT security practices
implemented, the overall picture does not look very good. The
“strong” position of hospitals in cluster 1 is relative. In other
words, the strongest hospitals in terms of IT security practices
implementation appear so simply because others are badly
failing.
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Figure 4. Health information technology security index across clusters. IT: information technology.
Influence of Context Variables on Health Information
Technology Security Patterns
To understand what determines HIT security patterns, we
analyzed the contextual variables cluster by cluster. The aim
here was to account for the influence of variables “theoretically
related to the clusters, but not used in defining clusters” [49].
Multimedia Appendix 2 presents the results of the test of
independence (chi-square test of goodness of fit) carried out to
assess whether characteristics of hospitals significantly vary
according to cluster membership. We do so by comparing the
observed and expected distributions of hospitals in different
clusters, and the chi-square tests indicate whether or not the
observed distributions significantly depart from the expected
distribution.
From Multimedia Appendix 2, one can note that only 2 out of
6 hospital characteristics (namely the university affiliation and
the size of hospitals) do not allow in any way to significantly
discriminate among hospitals’ membership in 1 cluster or
another.
The remaining categories of contextual variables present at least
1 characteristic that is significantly overrepresented in 1 or 2
clusters and underrepresented elsewhere. Hospitals in the
strongest cluster with regard to HIT security practices (cluster
1) are less likely to fall in the category of “independent/one
site” hospitals, and they are underrepresented among hospitals
that devote less than 1% of their total budget to the IT function.
Conversely, hospitals in cluster 1 are more likely to fall into the
category of “independent/multiple sites,” and they are more
likely to rely on both national and regional security regulations.
On the other end of the security implementation spectrum,
hospitals in the weakest cluster (cluster 3) are overrepresented
in the category of “independent/one site” hospitals, as well as
among hospitals that devote less than 1% of their total budget
to the IT function. They are less likely to base their IT security
and privacy practices on security regulations at any level
(national, regional, and hospital).
The results in relation to the context factors provide important
insights and raise some questions. The nonsignificance of the
university affiliation status of hospitals goes against the expected
results. Previous studies have shown that hospitals' university
affiliation is not neutral in their relationship to IT adoption [54]
and health data breach risks [55]. This last study shows that
health data breaches were more likely to happen in
university-affiliated hospitals than in nonaffiliated hospitals.
However, our results clearly indicate that the hospitals in our
sample are spread across the different clusters (corresponding
to different levels of IT security practices) regardless of their
university affiliation status. Being at increased risk for health
data breaches [55], university-affiliated hospitals should
implement IT security measures that are commensurate with
their risks.
The nonsignificance of the size of hospitals (number of beds)
was also surprising, as one would expect large hospitals to be
more aware of HIT security than smaller hospitals: we expected
large hospitals to be significantly more represented in cluster
1, which is the strongest with regard to the implementation of
HIT security practices. In addition, compared with small and
medium-sized hospitals, large hospitals are associated with an
increased risk of health data breaches [55], which is one more
reason to strengthen their IT security practices.
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Table 6. Transition toward an electronic-based system and health information technology security patterns.
Number of hospitalsTransition level
P valueChi-square (df)Cluster 3, n (%)=677 (39.29)Cluster 2, n (%)=533 (30.93)Cluster 1, n (%)=513 (29.77)
REOREORcEbOa
.00113.424.984.1109−6.266.260−18.763.745Paper-dominant, n
(%)=214 (12.42)
.690.810.1414.94252.3326.7329−12.4314.4302Hybrid, n (%)=1056
(61.28)
.00114.2−35.01781433.9140.114431.1134.9166Electronic-domi-
nant, n (%)=453
(26.29)
aO: observed.
bE: expected.
cR: residual.
The remaining contextual factors depict a more or less expected
picture. The independence status (as opposed to being part of
a group of hospitals/care institutions) and the number of sites
on which a hospital operates seem to be good predictors of
belonging to a weak or strong cluster in terms of implemented
IT security practices. Hospitals operating on multiple sites or
belonging to a group of other health care institutions need to
apply tight IT security measures as their level of exposure is
increased, and our results show that there is a trend in that
direction. These factors (as well as the university affiliation and
the hospital’s size) are structural in nature, and health authorities
cannot always act on them to affect IT security practices.
However, by understanding their influence on the
implementation of IT security practices, health authorities could
consider more targeted measures.
Health authorities can act on the level of the hospitals’ IT budget
(as a percentage of total hospital budget). Our results suggest
that a very low IT budget (in our case, an IT budget less than
1%) is not good for IT security practices implementation.
Interestingly, they also suggest that a higher IT budget (more
than 3.1%) does not make any difference. The optimal level of
IT budget seems to be a level between 1% and 3%. This result
raises more questions than answers. First, can we infer from
this result that the relationship between the levels of IT budget
and the levels of IT security practices implemented is in the
shape of an inverted u-curve, meaning that very lower levels of
IT budget are as counterproductive as very higher levels?
Second, what factors would explain why the range between 1%
and 3% is related to stronger IT practices implementation? This
question is more challenging given that we do not know the
portion of the overall IT budget hospitals in our sample
specifically devote to IT security. These questions deserve more
attention from researchers, and the answers would provide
hospitals with guidance to avoid both under or overinvestment
in IT security.
The security regulation constitutes another contextual factor
that health authorities can use as a leverage to encourage the
implementation of IT security practices in hospitals. It is
interesting to note that the adoption of any of the 3 types of
security regulations (national, regional, and hospital level)
appears to be better (in terms of IT security practices
implemented) than nonadoption. However, national and regional
regulations seem better than hospital-based security regulations.
Transition Toward an Electronic-Based System and
Health Information Technology Security Patterns
Table 6 presents how hospitals at different phases in their
transition toward a fully electronic-based system are distributed
across the 3 clusters depicting HIT security patterns. It appears
that hospitals in the earlier phases of the transition
(paper-dominant hospitals) are less likely to belong to cluster
1 and more likely to belong to cluster 3. Conversely, hospitals
that are well-advanced toward electronic-based systems
(electronic-dominant hospitals) are more likely to belong to
cluster 1 and less likely to belong to cluster 3. On the surface,
this seems good news as digitized hospitals are more likely to
be found in the strongest cluster with regards to HIT security
and privacy practices. However, a closer look at the distribution
of hospitals that have an electronic-dominant system across the
3 clusters leads to a less optimistic conclusion: actually, only
36.6% (166 out of 453) of these hospitals belong to cluster 1.
This means that there are many hospitals that consider
themselves to be well-advanced in their digitization process and
that at the same time display major weaknesses in their IT
security and privacy practices.
These results are a cause of concern when one considers (1)
that the top-ranking risk associated with EHR is the “privacy
of data - access control [56]” and (2) that some patients are
reluctant to disclose their health information to protect
themselves against the perceived EHR privacy and security
risks [57].
Ultimately, the consequences of the relative weaknesses in IT
security and privacy practices will obscure the benefits expected
from the European hospitals’ transition toward fully
electronic-based systems.
Implications and Conclusion
This study highlights a disturbing state in European hospitals
regarding the level of implementation of HIT security and
privacy practices. Overall, none of the 5 basic security practices
investigated in this study is present in more than 60% of
surveyed hospitals. Moreover, 3 out of 5 practices are absent
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in more than two-thirds of the hospitals that were surveyed in
this study. These statistics are unsettling as security practices
studied here are basic practices that should be implemented in
almost all hospitals. Encryption for stored data is used in only
37% of hospitals. It is used for transmitted data in only 59% of
hospitals. Many hospitals (more than 80%) do not deem it
necessary to control the access to workstations containing health
data with health professionals’ cards or codes. There is as few
as 18% of hospitals that have implemented these practices.
Hospitals in which all these measures are not implemented
expose health information to a breach of confidentiality.
In this study, the practices related to integrity and availability
are respectively measured at 31% and 57% implementation
rates in hospitals. These implementation rates are low for
systems containing highly sensitive information. They mean
that (1) in almost 70% hospitals, health data in IT systems can
be modified by nonauthorized persons, provided they have
access to the systems, and (2) more than 40% of surveyed
European hospitals would not be able to restore critical clinical
information in the aftermath of an incident, resulting in a partial
or complete loss of data.
There is another way of looking at our results. Our cluster
analysis allowed us to identify 3 patterns of HIT security
practices. The majority of surveyed hospitals falls into the 2
worst clusters (clusters 2 and 3): these 2 clusters total 1210
hospitals out of 1723 (70.22%). This means that 7 out of 10
European hospitals are performing poorly in ensuring the
security of their EHR.
We expected that hospitals that are well-advanced in their
transition toward a fully electronic health system would display
higher levels of implementation of IT security practices.
Confronting each hospital’s security index (a compounded
measure of implemented IT security and privacy practices) to
its level of transition toward a fully electronic health system,
we unraveled a rather mixed situation, showing that there are
many electronically advanced hospitals that are poor
implementers of IT security practices. This is great concern not
only for hospitals that are poorly equipped in IT security but
also for other hospitals with which they share health data and
above all for patients whose health information privacy is not
adequately protected.
The results presented in this study have theoretical and practical
implications. From a theoretical standpoint, it would be helpful
to further investigate why the health care sector continues to
lag behind in terms of IT security practices implementation.
How can one explain the contradiction between the stated
importance of IT security measures in hospital settings and the
weaknesses in this regard? Are there any sector-related factors
that explain the poor implementation of IT security practices
in health care organizations? Another research avenue stems
from 1 of the limitations of this study. As already mentioned in
the Methods section, in the absence of sound evidence
suggesting unequal importance of the 3 components of the IT
security triad (confidentiality, integrity, and availability), we
have assumed an equal weight for each of them. Future research
could challenge this assumption and provide empirical-based
evidence of the relative importance of the 3 components of the
IT security measure. Future research could also determine
whether and to what extent this relative importance depends on
organizational context. Our results about some context variables,
namely the university affiliation status and the size of hospitals,
raised an interesting question: why hospitals that present a higher
risk profile (university-affiliated hospitals and large hospitals),
according to previous research [55], do not appear to be among
the hospitals that take relatively strong IT security measures?
This question represents an interesting research avenue. Another
interesting research avenue is about the determination of the
optimal level of IT security investment in hospital settings.
From a practical standpoint, this study raises a red flag that
hospitals managers and health policy makers should not ignore.
The replacement of paper-based systems with electronic-based
systems comes with increased IT-related security risks and
requires adequate IT security measures. Thus, hospital managers
should make sure to include IT-security practices in their plans
toward fully electronic-based systems. For health policy makers,
when designing incentives for meaningful use of IT in health
care organizations, they should include stringent IT security
requirements. Both hospital managers and health policy makers
should monitor the digitization process of hospitals to ensure
that the implementation of IT security practices keeps pace with
the increasing usage of IT.
Although we had access to an interesting dataset collected
through a survey by the European Union, we were limited to
the questions asked in the survey. This is the problem of using
secondary data. We also acknowledge some limits stemming
from our definition of security practices. One could enlarge this
definition or completely choose other security practices. Besides,
we made the assumption of equal weight for all the 3
components (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) of the
IT security measure. This is a limitation the reader might take
into account when interpreting our results. For the transition
level toward a fully electronic-based system, we relied on a
self-reported level given by each hospital’s IT manager in the
absence of a more objective measure. This can be somehow
biased. Despite the abovementioned limits, this paper contributes
to the understanding of IT security practices in health care
organizations. It also contributes to raising awareness of the
security issues that can impede the effective delivery of health
care services.
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